DUKE BAR JOURNAL
grounds that the reliability of the lie detector has not attained sufficient recognition among scientists. 4 Thus, if either party in the Kaminski case had taken full advantage of the court's ruling by seeking to introduce into evidence the results of the test, their admission over objection would have been held error in the courts of last resort in all jurisdictions which have passed on the question.
In the principal case, as has been noted, however, the State made no effort to introduce the results of the test, but merely endeavored to show that a test had been taken. The inference probably intended to be drawn from this fact was that Newbold would not have submitted voluntarily to the test had he not been veracious, and that his direct testimony, therefore, was credible despite the subsequent conflicting testimony presented by the state. Any such inference undoubtedly would be reinforced by failure of the defendants to introduce the results of the test.
This appears to be the first case in which an appellate court has ruled on the admissibility of the bare fact, as distinguished from the results, of a lie detector test, offered for the purpose of sustaining the credibility of a witness.' Although strong arguments have been ad- (1950) , which held that the results of such tests were not admissible indirectly in an accusatory statement by a police officer to the effect that the lie detector indicated a violent reaction when defendant was confronted with the murder weapon.
[VOL. 4 vanced for admitting the results of lie detector tests, 6 if the rationale of the courts in rejecting them 7 is accepted, it would seem equally applicable where the admissibility of the mere fact of taking the test is in issue. It is improbable that any jury which hears evidence that a party or witness has submitted to a lie detector test will fail to draw some inference as to its results, no matter how vehement the court's cautionary instruction. If the courts will not receive the results of lie detector tests in evidence because of uncertainty as to their scientific reliability, they should not encourage juries to infer these results. Indeed, compounding the danger of the unreliability of these results would be the danger that juries would draw incorrect and unwarranted inferences therefrom. As a matter of logical consistency, therefore, the decision of the appellate court in this case was both inevitable and proper.
S. PERRY KEZIAH ' The most frequent argument in support of admission of lie detector evidence is that where a proper foundation as to the efficacy and limitations of the instrument has been laid, the jury should be allowed to weigh these results along with other evidence bearing upon the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
